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Introduction to linear logic and ludics, Part I
Pierre-Louis Curien (CNRS & Universite´ Paris VII)
January 18, 2005
Abstract
In this two-part survey paper, we introduce linear logic and ludics, which were both introduced
by Girard, in 1986 and 2001, respectively. They offer a thorough revisitation of mathematical logic
from first principles, with inspiration from and applications to computer science. Some important
keywords are: resources, geometry of computation, polarities, interaction, and games.
Prerequisites
We assume some basic knowledge of sequent calculus and natural deduction (see [15, 18]), of λ-calculus
(the classical reference is [5], see also [20]), and of category theory (only in section 7, see [25]).
Warning
This paper is not trying to survey the whole and impressive body of works on linear logic since 17
years, but rather chooses a route that tries to highlight the deep originality of the subject. The
bibliography is in consequence very partial (also reading the latter as a French word, wich meanss
something like “personal”, possibly biased).
1 Introduction
Linear logic arose from the semantic study of λ-calculus, specifically, the second-order typed λ-calculus,
or system F (see [15]). Shortly after proposing the first denotational model of system F [13], Girard
realized that in coherence spaces (to be introduced in section 7) the interpretation of type A → B
decomposes naturally as (!A) ⊸ B (this will be detailed in section 6), and in almost no time a full-
fledged new logic, with a totally innovative way of representing proofs and to execute them, that is,
to perform cut-elimination, was created. We tell this story here, not in the order in which it unfolded,
but starting from so-called substructural considerations. We raise the question of what happens
when we remove some of the structural rules from sequent calculus, most importantly contraction.
Substructural logics of various kinds have been considered much before the birth of linear logic, but
what characterizes truly linear logic is not that aspect, but rather the controlled way in which the
structural rules of weakening and contraction are reintroduced, by means of the new modality ! (“of
course”) (and its dual ? (“why not”)). This, together with proof nets, constitutes the major break-
through of linear logic.
Let us consider the implication in the absence of contraction. In λ-calculus, this corresponds
to considering terms in which each variable occurs at most once. (Here we use the Curry-Howard
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correspondence between proofs and programs, see [15]). Consider thus the set of affine λ-terms built
with the following constraints: x is an affine term, if M is an affine term then λx.M is an affine term,
and if M,N are affine terms with disjoint sets of free variables then MN is an affine term. The key
fact about affine terms is the following:
Affine terms normalize in linear time.
The reason is trivial: each β-reduction reduces the size, keeping in mind that P [x← Q] is the result
of the substitution of at most one occurrence of x with Q, so P [x ← Q] is shorter by at least the
two symbols of abstraction and application that have been absorbed by the reduction of (λx.P )Q. Of
course, this linearity is one of the reasons for the name Linear Logic.
In contrast, arbitrary λ-terms may take an exponential time and more to reach their normal form.
For example, the reader may play with mn, where n = λfx.fn(x) (Church numerals – here, f0(x) = x
and fn+1(x) = f(fn(x))).
As another instance of the phenomenon of duplication, or of multiple use of a variable (or assump-
tion), think of a constructive reading of (∀x ∃ y x < y) from which one may wish to extract a program
creating an infinite strictly increasing sequence of numbers. The program extracted from the formula
will actually be a procedure to produce a y > x, when given an x, and it will be called in a loop. In
linear logic, this formula would have to be written !(∀x ∃ y x < y).
Rather than continuing a long introduction, we decide to enter in the subject proper, and we
content ourselves with giving a plan of the sections to come. In section 2, we introduce so-called
multiplicative-addditive linear logic, and we complete the description of (propositional) linear logic
with the exponentials in section 3. We shall not consider quantifiers in this survey paper, in any
case, they look very much as usual. Then, in section 4, we illustrate the expressivity of linear logic by
sketching the proof that propositional linear logic is undecidable, a property that sharply distinguishes
linear logic from classical and intuitionistic logics. The following three sections are concerned with
the semantics of linear logic. We first discuss phase semantics, which is just a semantics of provability
(section 5), then we introduce the coherence semantics, already alluded to (section 6), and finally we
address the question of more general categorical definitions of models (section 7).
In part II, we shall go back to syntactic issues and introduce proof nets. In particular, we shall
address the so-called correctness criteria: proof nets are elegant representations of proofs avoiding
some useless sequentializations imposed by sequent calculus. Reconstructing the sequentializations
and thus asserting that a proof structure, that is, a would-be proof net, is actually a proof net, is a
fascinating problem, that relates to games semantics [22, 1]. The last sections (a polished form of [8])
are devoted to ludics, which while strongly inspired by linear logic takes a more radical view of proofs
as interactive processes, evolving in space and time.
Here is a table of sources I have been using for writing this paper. The reader will be able to find
more complete information and proofs by going to these references, as well as to the many others that
he will find in their bibliographies or on the Web!
sections 2 and 3 [14, 16, 9] (slightly revisited here in the light of ludics)
section 4 [24] (a remarkably well-written paper)
sections 5 and 6 [14]
section 7 [26] (which itself is a survey)
proof nets [14, 12, 19, 4]
ludics [17]
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2 Multiplicatives and additives
In sequent calculus, depending on presentations, you can see the left and right rules for, say, conjunc-
tion given in this format:
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ∧B ⊢ ∆
Γ, B ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ∧B ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ ⊢ B,∆
Γ ⊢ A ∧B,∆
or in that format:
Γ, A,B ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ∧B ⊢ ∆
Γ1 ⊢ A,∆1 Γ2 ⊢ B,∆2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A ∧B,∆1,∆2
The two formats have been called additive and multiplicative, respectively, by Girard. We recall that
a sequent Γ ⊢ ∆ is made of two multisets of formulas (that is, we work modulo the so-called exchange
rule which says that Γ ⊢ ∆ entails any of its permutations – on the contrary, rejecting this rule leads
to a complicated and still not very well-understood subject called non-commutative (linear) logic).
The notation Γ1,Γ2 stands for the multiset union of Γ1 and Γ2.
Logicians did not bother about these different presentations, because they are equivalent. Yes, but
modulo the contraction and weakening rules:
Γ, A,A ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ A,A,∆
Γ ⊢ A,∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ, A ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ ∆
Γ ⊢ A,∆
Let us show this, say, for the left introduction rule. Let us first derive the multiplicative format from
the additive one:
Γ1 ⊢ A,∆1
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A,∆1,∆2
Γ2 ⊢ B,∆2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ B,∆1,∆2
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ A ∧B,∆1,∆2
where the double line expresses multiple use of the weakening rules. For the converse direction we
have:
Γ ⊢ A,∆ Γ ⊢ B,∆
Γ,Γ ⊢ A ∧B,∆,∆
Γ ⊢ A ∧B,∆
using contractions. If we remove contraction and weakening, then the presentations are no longer
equivalent and hence define different connectives, ⊗ and &, respectively called “tensor” and “with”. In-
deed, you will see in section 6 that they are interpreted very differently. Moreover, the coherence space
model (to which the curious reader may jump directly) enlightens the terminology multiplicative–
additive, as the reader will check that the cardinal of (the interpretation of) A ⊗ B (resp. A&B) is
the product (resp. the sum) of the cardinals of (the interpretations of) A,B.
Similarly, we split “disjunction” in two connectives, O and ⊕, respectively called “par” and “plus”.
As usual in sequent calculus, the left rule for, say, ⊗, tells us by duality what the right rule for O
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is, and similarly for ⊕. This leads us to the following monolateral sequent presentation of the four
connectives:
MULTIPLICATIVES
⊢ A,B,Γ
⊢ AOB,Γ
⊢ A,Γ1 ⊢ B,Γ2
⊢ A⊗B,Γ1,Γ2
ADDITIVES
⊢ A,Γ
⊢ A⊕B,Γ
⊢ B,Γ
⊢ A⊕B,Γ
⊢ A,Γ ⊢ B,Γ
⊢ A&B,Γ
Considered as (associative and commutative) operations, these four connectives have units “true”
and “false”, each of them splits into the multiplicative and additive one:
O ⊗ ⊕ &
⊥ 1 0 ⊤
(As for the terminology and for mnemotechnicity, the names 1 and 0 correspond to the usual mul-
tiplicative and additive notation in groups.) We shall synthesize the rules for the units from the
requirement that the isomorphisms A⊗ 1 ≈ A, etc..., should hold. In order to prove ⊢ A⊗ 1,Γ from
⊢ A,Γ we should have ⊢ 1. In order to prove ⊢ AO⊥,Γ from ⊢ A,Γ, we should have ⊢ A,⊥,Γ as an
intermediate step, which suggests the rule for ⊥ given below. We derive ⊢ A⊕ 0,Γ from ⊢ A,Γ by the
(left) ⊕ rule, without any need for a (right) rule for 0. Finally, we need ⊢ ⊤,Γ to derive ⊢ A&⊤,Γ
from ⊢ A,Γ:
⊢ A ⊢ 1
⊢ A⊗ 1
⊢ A,Γ
⊢ A,⊥,Γ
⊢ AO⊥,Γ
⊢ A,Γ
⊢ A⊕ 0,Γ
⊢ A,Γ ⊢ ⊤,Γ
⊢ A&⊤,Γ
The rules are thus:
UNITS
⊢ 1
⊢ Γ
⊢ ⊥,Γ no rule for 0 ⊢ ⊤,Γ
An even shorter way to synthesize the rules for the units is to formulate rules for n-ary versions of
the four connectives, and then to take the degenerate case n = 0. The assumption of the n-ary O
rule is ⊢ A1, . . . , An,Γ, which degenerates to ⊢ Γ. For the tensor rule there are n assumptions and
the conclusion is ⊢ A1⊗ . . .⊗An,Γ, with Γ = Γ1, . . . ,Γn, and in the degenerate case we thus have no
assumption and Γ = ∅. There are n ⊕ rules, and thus no rule in the degenerate case. Finally, the &
rule has n assumptions, and thus no assumption in the degenerate case.
What about negation? In classical logic, negation can be boiled down to negation on atomic
formulas only, thanks to De Morgan laws: ¬(A∧B) = (¬A)∨ (¬B), from which the other De Morgan
law follows, using ¬¬A = A. This works also for linear logic, where negation is written A⊥ (“A
orthogonal”, or “A perp”). But the logical operations being different, negation in linear logic is very
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different from that of classical logic. In classical logic, we have both A = ¬¬A and ⊢ A ∨ ¬A (the
latter being what constructivists criticized), while in linear logic we have A = A⊥⊥ and ⊢ AOA⊥, but
we do not have ⊢ A ⊕ A⊥, and as a matter of fact linear logic retains the distinctive features that
make intuitionistic logic so nice: confluence (of cut-elimination), and the disjunction property (for ⊕,
see below).
Thanks to De Morgan laws, we can dispense with negation as a connective, and consider A⊥ as
an abbreviation for its De Morgan normal form obtained by applying the following rules (where we
have added the not-yet introduced “!” and “?” for completeness):
(A⊗B)⊥ → (A⊥)O(B⊥) (AOB)⊥ → (A⊥)⊗ (B⊥) 1⊥ → ⊥ ⊥⊥ → 1
(A&B)⊥ → (A⊥)⊕ (B⊥) (A⊕B)⊥ → (A⊥)&(B⊥) ⊤⊥ → 0 0⊥ → ⊤
(!A)⊥ →?(A⊥) (?A)⊥ →!(A⊥)
(Notice that the dual under ⊥ of a multiplicative (resp. additive) connective is a multiplicative (resp.
additive) connective.) In the sequel, we shall freely use bilateral sequents in examples, but they can
be seen as syntactic sugar for monolateral ones, for example A1, A2 ⊢ B is a version of ⊢ A
⊥
1 , A
⊥
2 , B.
Hence, thanks to duality, linear logic puts all formulas of a sequent on the same ground, in contrast to
intuitionistic logic, where there is a clear distinction between input (Γ) and output (A) in a sequent
Γ ⊢ A.
To complete the description of the multiplicative-additive fragment of linear logic, we need axioms,
and the cut rule. The latter is not needed in the sense that it can be eliminated (just as in classical
or intuitionisitc sequent calculus), but one can hardly use the system without cuts, which carry the
intelligent part of proofs.
AXIOM CUT
⊢ A,A⊥
⊢ A,Γ1 ⊢ A⊥,Γ2
⊢ Γ1,Γ2
(Note that the cut rule is given in a multiplicative style, i.e., it is quite similar to the tensor rule. That
the axiom has this most economical format, as opposed to ⊢ A,A⊥,Γ, should come as no surprise, as
the latter embodies an implicit weakening.)
As explained in the introduction, the main motivation for the removal of (weakening and) contrac-
tion is the control on normalisation. Indeed, the reader can easily check that all affine λ-terms can be
typed by the following rules:
x : A ⊢ x : A
Γ1 ⊢M1 : A⊸ B Γ2 ⊢M2 : A
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢M1M2 : B
Γ, x : A ⊢M : B
Γ ⊢ λx.M : A⊸ B
Notice the multiplicative style of the crucial typing rule for application. As usual, “A implies B” is
“not A or B”, and specifically here A ⊸ B = (A⊥)OB (⊸ reads “linearly implies”). This natural
deduction style rule is indeed encoded in sequent calculus using the (multiplicative) cut rule:
Γ1 ⊢ A⊥OB
Γ2 ⊢ A ⊢ B⊥, B
Γ2 ⊢ A⊗B⊥, B
Γ1,Γ2 ⊢ B
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This leads us to the main conceptual novelty of linear logic: the understanding of formulas as resources,
that are consumed through entailment: in the sequent A ⊢ B, the resource A is consumed in order to
get B (think also of a chemical reaction). This is like in an abstract state machine, which changes state
upon performing certain actions. As a matter of fact, we present an encoding of such a machine in
section 4. With this reading in mind, one easily understands how bad contraction and weakening are.
Suppose that B is some good, and A is a given amount of money, say 20 Euros. Then A,A ⊢ B reads
as: “you can acquire B against 40 Euros”. The contraction rule would say that you could acquire
the same good for 20 Euros. Thus, contraction is not very good for the merchant. It is not good in
chemistry either: in a reaction, in order to obtain 2H2O you need to have exactly four H
+ and two
O−2. Another way to criticize the rule is by looking from conclusion to antecedents (proof-search): if
you only have A to get B, your resource A cannot be magically duplicated, as the contraction rule
would imply.
As for weakening, if you can buy B with A, as formalized by A ⊢ B, why would you – the buyer –
spend an additional amount of money C to get B (C,A ⊢ B)? Weakening is not good for the client.
So far, we have insisted on a dichotomy between additive and multiplicative connectives. There
is however another grouping of connectives, that was sitting there from the beginning, and that has
even been somehow made explicitly by the choice of symbols: ⊗ and ⊕ on one hand, and & and O
on the other hand. Girard noticed that ⊗ distributes over ⊕ (like in arithmetic!), and that dually
O distributes over &, while other thinkable combinations do not distribute upon each other (it is an
instructive exercise to check this). Let us examine the proof of this distributivity law. We have to
prove ⊢ (A⊗ (B ⊕ C))⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗C) and ⊢ ((A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗C))⊥, A⊗ (B ⊕C). Both proofs
begin by decomposing the O’s and the &’s. For the first sequent, this goes as follows:
⊢ A⊥, B⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C) ⊢ A⊥, C⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C)
⊢ A⊥, (B⊥&C⊥), (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C)
⊢ A⊥O(B⊥&C⊥), (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C)
and we are left to prove the subgoals ⊢ A⊥, B⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗C) and ⊢ A⊥, C⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗C).
Similarly, the search of a proof of the second sequent yields ⊢ A⊥, B⊥, A⊗ (B⊕C) and ⊢ A⊥, C⊥, A⊗
(B ⊕ C) as subgoals. Before we proceed, note an important feature of & and O: in each of the two
proof constructions, the two subgoals together are actually equivalent to the original goal: these two
connectives are reversible – an affirmation that we shall make formal just below. In contrast, in order
to complete the proof of any of the subgoals, we have to make (irreversible) decisions. We just give
the proof of ⊢ A⊥, B⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C), but the others are similar:
⊢ A⊥, A ⊢ B⊥, B
⊢ A⊥, B⊥, (A⊗B)
⊢ A⊥, B⊥, (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C)
The two decisions which we have made in this proof are: to choose the left ⊕ rule, and then to split
A⊥, B⊥ in the way we did, assigning the resource A⊥ for the proof of A and B⊥ for the proof of B.
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The opposition ⊗–⊕ versus O–& is actually fundamental, and has played an important role in the
genesis of ludics (see part II). The following table summarizes its significance:
⊗ ⊕ O &
Irreversible Reversible
Non-deterministic Deterministic
Active Passive
Player Opponent
External choice Internal choice
Positive Negative
We first show that the rules for O and & are reversible, that is, that the conclusions of the rules hold
if and only if their antecedents hold, as follows:
⊢ Γ, AOB
⊢ A⊥, A ⊢ B⊥, B
⊢ A⊥OB⊥, A,B
⊢ Γ, A,B
⊢ A&B,Γ
⊢ A⊥, A
⊢ A⊥ ⊕B⊥, A
⊢ A,Γ
Hence we lose nothing by replacing ⊢ Γ, AOB with ⊢ Γ, A,B in proof-search, and moreover we can
gain something, since the liberated immediate subformulas A and B can then be sent to different
antecedents when decomposing a tensor (as in the proof of ⊢ AOB,A⊥ ⊗ B⊥). The O and & rules
are moreover deterministic in the sense that, once the formula to be decomposed in the sequent is
fixed, then there is no choice on how to do it: for the O rule, just dissolve the O, and for the & rule,
prove the two subgoals, which are the same sequent up to the replacement of the formula by one of
its immediate subformulas. As we shall see in part II, provided a certain proof-search discipline is
respected, which can be phrased as “apply reversible rules in priority”, and if maximal groups of rules
concerning reversible (resp. irreversible) connectives are grouped and considered as a single synthetic
rule, then sequents always contain at most one formula whose topmost connective is reversible, and
therefore even the choice of which formula of the sequent to decompose is deterministic. This absence
of initiative can be termed passivity.
Let us examine a contrario what makes the other connectives active and irreversible. We have
already hinted at this when we proved the distributivity law. Each ⊕ rule, read bottom-up, chooses
one of A or B, while each instance of the ⊗-rule makes a choice of how to split the (rest of the) sequent
in two parts. The choice of which formula of the sequent to decompose is also non-deterministic. In
other words, the two connectives are associated with some actions that must be taken.
The next pair in our list places us in the tradition of the dialogue game interpretation of proofs,
which goes back to Gentzen. A proof is the work of one person, the Player (think of a student), which
another person, the Opponent (think of an examiner) can check. Checking goes by tests, or plays. The
Opponent challenges the conclusion of the proof, to which the Player has to answer by displaying the
last rule he used. The Opponent then chooses one of the antecedents of the rule, and challenges the
Player to justify that particular antecedent, to which the Player answers by displaying the last rule
used to show this antecedent, etc... The play results in disclosing, or exploring, a part of the proof.
We shall come back to this game interpretation in part II. Here, we shall content ourselves with an
illustration, Yves Lafont’s menu:
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Menu (price 17 Euros)
Quiche or Salad
Chicken or Fish
Banana or “Surprise du Chef∗”
(*) either “Profiteroles” or “Tarte Tatin”
17E ⊢


(Q&S)
⊗
(C&F )
⊗
(B&(P ⊕ T ))
We can recognize here some of the meanings that we already discussed. The right of the sequent is
what you can get for 17 Euros. The tensor tells that for this price you get one “entre´e”, one dish
and one dessert. The difference between & and ⊕ is a bit more subtle, and the game interpretation
is helpful here. So let us start again from the beginning, considering a play between the restaurant
manager (the Player) and the customer (the Opponent). It is the Player’s responsibility to split the
17E into three parts, corresponding to the cost of the three parts of the meal. May be, this is done
as follows:
5E ⊢ Q&S 8E ⊢ C&F 4E ⊢ B&(P ⊕ T )
17E ⊢ (Q&S)⊗ (C&F )⊗ (B&(P ⊕ T ))
Now let the Opponent challenge 5E ⊢ Q&S:
5E ⊢ Q 5E ⊢ S
5E ⊢ Q&S
which reads as: both Quiche and Salad are available to the customer, but he can get only one, and it is
his choice of picking one of the antecedents and to order, say, a Quiche. Thus the additive conjunction
can be understood as a ... disjunction embodying a notion of external choice (remember that in our
example the customer is the Opponent, or the context, or the environment). Let us now analyse a
proof of 4E ⊢ B&(P ⊕ T ):
4E ⊢ B
4E ⊢ T
4E ⊢ P ⊕ T
4E ⊢ B&(P ⊕ T )
Suppose that the Opponent chooses the Surprise. Then it is the Player’s turn, who justifies 4E ⊢ P⊕T
using the right ⊕ rule. So, the Opponent will get a Tarte Tatin, but the choice was in the Player’s
hands. Thus ⊕ has an associated meaning of internal choice. In summary, two forms of choice,
external and internal, are modelled by & and ⊕, respectively. In the case of ⊕, whether A or B is
chosen is controlled by the rule, that is, by the Player. In the case of &, the choice between A or B
is a choice of one of the antecedents of the rule, and is in the hands of the Opponent.
Actually, our image becomes even more acurate if we replace the customer with an inspector (in
summer, many restaurants propose unreasonable prices to the tourists...). The inspector will not
consume the whole menu, he will just check (his choice!) whether what is offered, say for the entre´e, is
correct (not over-priced, fresh enough...). Another inspector, or the same inspector, may want to do
another experiment later, checking this time on dessert: using this sharper personification, the game
as explained above is more fully reflected.
All these oppositions confirm a fundamental polarity: by convention, we shall term & and O as
negative, and ⊗ and ⊕ as positive.
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3 Full linear logic
In order to recover the power of the full λ-calculus (or of intuitionistic logic), we reintroduce the
structural rules, but only on formulas marked with a modality (actually two: “!” and its dual “?”):
⊢?A, ?A,Γ
⊢?A,Γ
⊢ Γ
⊢?A,Γ
The rules are easier to explain in a bilateral format. If you want to prove !A,Γ ⊢ B, then contraction
allows you to give yourself the freedom of using the assumption !A twice, or more: if you have been
able to prove !A, . . . , !A,Γ ⊢ B, then you can conclude by using (repeated contractions). Similarly,
weakening allows you to forget assumptions of the form !A: having a proof of Γ ⊢ B is enough to get
!A,Γ ⊢ B.
The connective ! is a connective just as the others, and thus has its left and right introduction
rules (?Γ denotes a multiset of formulas each of the form ?A):
Dereliction Promotion
Γ, A
⊢ Γ, ?A
⊢?Γ, A
⊢?Γ, !A
Our description of linear logic (LL) is now complete! The two connectives ! and ? are called the
EXPONENTIALS.
A variation on the promotion rule, which is inspired by categorical considerations (see section 7),
and also by considerations of the geometry of interaction (see part II) is:
⊢ Γ, A
⊢?Γ, !A
⊢??A,Γ
⊢?A,Γ
These two rules together are equivalent to the promotion rule. We just show here how the second rule
can be derived:
⊢??A,Γ
⊢!A⊥, ?A
⊢!!A⊥, ?A
⊢?A,Γ
For intuitionistic or classical sequent calculus, the key result to establish in order to be able to make
some use of it is the cut-elimination theorem. It holds here too, but we shall not prove it here (this
is done in full detail, say, in the appendix of [24]), and we shall rather content ourselves with giving
only a few cut-elimination rules, without conviction, since a much better representation of proofs –
prof nets – will be given in part II. It is good that the reader see what he gains, though!
⊢ A⊥, A
Π
...
⊢ A⊥,Γ
⊢ A⊥,Γ −→
Π
...
⊢ A⊥,Γ
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Π
...
⊢ Γ1, ?B⊥, ?B⊥
⊢ Γ1, ?B⊥
Π′
...
⊢?Γ2, B
⊢?Γ2, !B
⊢ Γ1, ?Γ2 −→
Π
...
⊢ Γ1, ?B⊥, ?B⊥
Π′
...
⊢?Γ2, B
⊢?Γ2, !B
⊢ Γ1, ?Γ2, ?B⊥
Π′
...
⊢?Γ2, B
⊢?Γ2, !B
⊢ Γ1, ?Γ2, ?Γ2
⊢ Γ1, ?Γ2
The second rule illustrates duplication of proofs, while the first one is the reinsuring one: cuts may
vanish!
***** AJOUTER DES REGLES COMMUTATIVES *****
We can now give a translation of (simply-typed) λ-calculus:
Γ, x : A ⊢ x : A
Γ, x : A ⊢M : B
Γ ⊢ λx.M : A→ B
Γ ⊢M : A→ B Γ ⊢ N : A
Γ ⊢MN : B
into LL proofs. This translation takes (a proof of) a judgement Γ ⊢ M : A and turns it into a proof
[[Γ ⊢ M : A]] of ⊢?(Γ∗)⊥, A, where ∗ applies to all formulas of Γ, (hereditarily) turning all B → C’s
into ?B⊥OC. Formally:
A∗ = A (A atomic) (B → C)∗ =?(B∗)⊥OC∗ ?(Γ∗)⊥ = {?(A∗)⊥ | A ∈ Γ}
The reason why Γ ⊢ A becomes ⊢?Γ⊥, A (or !Γ ⊢ A) should be clear: a variable can have several
occurrences in a term, whence the need of a contraction rule to type it (using multiplicative and
exponential connectives only). The translation is as follows (we omit the ∗ for a better readability).
Variable Abstraction
[[Γ, x : A ⊢ x : A]] =
A⊥, A
⊢?Γ⊥, A⊥, A
⊢?Γ⊥, ?A⊥, A [[Γ ⊢ λx.M : A→ B]] =
[[Γ, x : A ⊢ M : B]]
...
⊢?Γ⊥, ?A⊥, B
⊢?Γ⊥, (?A⊥OB)
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Application
[[Γ ⊢MN : B]] =
[[Γ ⊢M : A→ B]]
...
⊢?Γ⊥, ?A⊥OB
[[Γ ⊢ N : A]]
...
⊢?Γ⊥, A
⊢?Γ⊥, !A ⊢ B⊥, B
⊢?Γ⊥, !A⊗B⊥, B
⊢?Γ⊥, ?Γ⊥, B
⊢?Γ⊥, B
Of course, this is not enough to declare that we have a satisfactory translation. The translation should
be also computationally sound, in the sense that ifM reduces to N , then the translation ofM reduces
to the translation of N . It is the case with this translation, but it is not so immediate to establish, as
the translation does two things at the same time: it factors a translation from intuitionistic natural
deduction (NJ) to intuitionistic sequent calculus (LJ) and a translation of LJ to LL.
There are also other qualities that one may require of a translation: for example, that it should
send cut-free proofs to cut-free proofs. Another (stronger) requirement is that the translation should
respect the skeleton of the translated proof, that is, the translation contents itself with introducing
some derelictions and promotions in the original proof. We refrain from going into this here. Let us
just say that the (LJ to LL part of the) above translation does not respect these two requirements, but
other “more verbose” ones (i.e., using more occurrences of the modalities) do. A thorough analysis of
the translations of intuitionistic (and also classical) logic in linear logic can be found in [10, 11] (see
also [9]).
We end the section with an important isomorphism: !(A&B) ≡ (!A)⊗ (!B) (from which the name
exponential comes: think of “eA+B = eA × eB”). We prove only one side and leave the other to the
reader (of course, we are doing the same job as at the beginning of section 2):
⊢ A⊥, A
⊢?A⊥, A
⊢?A⊥, ?B⊥, A
⊢ B⊥, B
⊢?B⊥, B
⊢?A⊥, ?B⊥, B
⊢?A⊥, ?B⊥, A&B
⊢?A⊥, ?B⊥, !(A&B)
⊢?A⊥O?B⊥, !(A&B)
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4 Proposition linear logic is undecidable
We are interested in the decidability of the following problem: given Γ, is it decidable wether ⊢ Γ
is provable? For MALL, this problem is decidable, as the possible cut-free proofs of a given sequent
can be enumerated. This is because in a cut-free proof the formulas that can appear in the proof are
subformulas of the formulas in the conclusion (this is the well-known subformula property), so there
is a finite number of them, and moreover the absence of contraction guarantees that there are also
finitely many possible sequents. Think of a proof of ⊢ Γ, A that would repeatedly apply contraction to
A, thus searching ⊢ Γ, A,A, ⊢ Γ, A,A,A,. . . . This is not allowed in MALL (since the exponentials are
omitted). But the complexity is high, and in fact the problem is NP-complete. We refer to [24][Section
2] for the instructive and pleasing proof, which relies on an encoding of quantified boolean formulas
in MALL.
What about full LL? It turns out that the Halting Problem for (a variant of) Two Counter
Machines can be faithfully encoded in propositional linear logic, which entails the undecidability of
the logic [24][Section 3]. (Note that this is in sharp contrast with classical propositional logic, for
which decidability follows from the possibility of an exhaustive check of the truth values.) We next
explain the encoding, and the structure of the proof of its faithfulness.
A Two Counter Machine (TCM) is given by a set S of states, with two distinguished states qI and
qF (the initial and final states, respectively) and by 5 sets of instructions I1, I2, I3, I4, I5, where I1
through I4 are subsets of S × S and I5 is a subset of S × S × S. We use the following user-friendlier
notation:
qi
+A−→ qj
qi
−A−→ qj
qi
+B−→ qj
qi
−B−→ qj
qi
fork
−→ qj , qk


for


(qi, qj) ∈ I1
(qi, qj) ∈ I2
(qi, qj) ∈ I3
(qi, qj) ∈ I4
(qi, qj, qk) ∈ I5
These instructions act on instantaneous descriptions (ID’s), which are multisets s of triplets of the
form (q,m, n) ∈ S × ω × ω (ω being the set of natural numbers), as follows (where union is taken in
the sense of multisets, e.g. {x, y} ∪ {x} = {x, x, y}):
qi
+A−→ qj (qi,m, n) ∈ s
s→ s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m+ 1, n)}
qi
−A−→ qj (qi,m, n) ∈ s m > 0
s→ s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m− 1, n)}
qi
+B−→ qj (qi,m, n) ∈ s
s→ s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m, n+ 1)}
qi
−B−→ qj (qi,m, n) ∈ s n > 0
s→ s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m, n− 1)}
qi
fork
−→ qj , qk (qi,m, n) ∈ s
s→ s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj,m, n), (qk,m, n)}
Note that the instructions −A and −B can only act on triplets of the form (q,m, n) with m > 0 and
n > 0, respectively. A triplet (q,m, n) formalizes a machine in state q whose two counters A and B
hold values m ≥ 0 and n ≥ 0, respectively. The last type of instructions is what makes these TCM’s a
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variant of the standard ones, which have instead two zero-test instructions for the two counters A,B,
and which act on triplets (q,m, n), rather than on multisets of such triplets. The fork instruction
necessitates these more complicated instantaneous descriptions, which formalize a cluster of machines
working in parallel, one for each triplet, or local ID, of the multiset. A fork instruction executed by
one of the machines M can be understood as launching a new TCM M’ with initial local ID, say,
(qk,m, n) while M evolves to local ID (qj ,m, n). The counters are local to the machines, hence the
counters of M’ can later evolve differently from the counters of M.
We are now ready for the encoding. States are encoded as (distinct) atomic formulas of the same
name. Moreover, we pick two fresh distinct atomic formulas a and b, and we set a0 = 1, a1 = a, and
an+1 = an ⊗ a, and similarly for b. The fact that counter A holds value n will be encoded by the
formula an. We next encode rules as follows:
qi
+A−→ qj
qi
−A−→ qj
qi
+B−→ qj
qi
−B−→ qj
qi
fork
−→ qj , qk


for


qi ⊢ qj ⊗ a
qi ⊗ a ⊢ qj
qi ⊢ qj ⊗ b
qi ⊗ b ⊢ qj
qi ⊢ qj ⊕ qk
We have used bilateral sequents to help understanding: one reads, say, the first kind of rules as:
“exchange qi for qj and for one more a” (incrementing the counter A). We shall soon see why ⊕ is
the right connective to use for the fifth sort of rules. Formally, we interpret each rule as a formula, as
follows:
[[qi
+A−→ qj ]] =?((q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a))
⊥)
[[qi
−A−→ qj ]] =?(((qi ⊗ a)
⊥
Oqj)
⊥)
[[qi
+B−→ qj ]] =?((q⊥i O(qj ⊗ b))
⊥)
[[qi
−B−→ qj ]] =?(((qi ⊗ b)⊥Oqj)⊥)
[[qi
fork
−→ qj , qk]] =?((q
⊥
i O(qj ⊕ qk))
⊥)
The reason for the ?(( )⊥) format is that we want to be able to use the encodings of rules as axioms,
whenever needed, and hence possibly repetitively. We write ⊢′ Γ for ⊢ Γ∪ [[I1]]∪ [[I2]]∪ [[I3]]∪ [[I4]]∪ [[I5]].
Proposition 4.1 Let M be a TCM, and s be an ID for M. Then M accepts from s, i.e., there exists
a sequence of transitions s →∗ s′ where s′ consists only of identical triplets (qF , 0, 0), if and only if,
for every triplet (q,m, n) ∈ s, the sequent ⊢′ q⊥, (am)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF is provable.
Informally, the characterization in the statement reads as: assuming q⊗ am⊗ bn (the encoding of the
triplet (q,m, n)) and all the rules as axioms, then qF is provable, for all triplets of s. Let us observe
that M accepts from s if and only it accepts from each of the members of s, since each triplet of s′
can be traced back to exactly one triplet of s, whence the “for all” form of the statement.
Proof (indication). We first sketch the easy part of the proof, namely that accepting implies
provable. The proof is by induction on the length of the reduction s→∗ s′. In the base case we have
s = s′, hence all the elements of s are (qF , 0, 0), and the conclusion holds by weakening of the axiom
⊢ q⊥F , qF . So, let s→ s1 →
∗ s′. If s1 = s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m+ 1, n)}, then all we are left to prove
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is that ⊢′ q⊥i , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF , knowing that ⊢′ q⊥j , (a
m+1)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF . The proof is as follows:
...
⊢′ q⊥j , (a
m+1)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
⊢′ q⊥j Oa
⊥, (am)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
⊢ (q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a))
⊥, q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a)
⊢?((q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a))
⊥), q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a)
⊢?((q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a))
⊥), q⊥i , qj ⊗ a
⊢′ ?((q⊥i O(qj ⊗ a))
⊥), q⊥i , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
⊢′ q⊥i , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
(modulo the reversibility of O, and using the contraction rule at the end). We chek the case s1 =
s \ {(qi,m, n)} ∪ {(qj ,m, n), (qk,m, n)} more informally, as follows:
...
⊢ q⊥j , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
...
⊢ q⊥k , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
⊢ q⊥j &q
⊥
k , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF ⊢ q⊥i , qj ⊕ qk
⊢ q⊥i , (a
m)⊥, (bn)⊥, qF
Note that from a dialogue game point of view, the opponent of the proof has the choice of which
triplet to check, either (qj ,m, n) or (qk,m, n), whence the presence of the external choice connective
& in the encoding ?(qi ⊗ (q⊥j &q
⊥
k )) of the fork rule.
The converse direction (provable implies accepting) goes by analysing the cut-free proofs of the
encodings of acceptation, and by showing that they are essentially unique and that one can read back
an accepting sequence of transitions. 
Since given M and s it is undecidable whether M accepts from s, we conclude by reduction that
LL is undecidable.
Exercise 4.2 Formalize the proof of decidability of MALL outlined above. Hints: (1) associate with
each sequent ⊢ ∆ a complexity measure c(⊢ ∆) such that for each instance of a MALL rule
antecedent 1 . . . antecedent n
conclusion
we have c(antecedent i) < c(conclusion) for all i; (2) then show that the set of “possible proofs” of a
sequent (i.e. the trees whose internal nodes correspond to correct application of the rules of MALL
and whose leaves are sequents Γ where Γ consists of atomic formulas only) can be effectively generated;
(3) then show that one can effectively check which among these “possible proofs” are real proofs (look
at the leaves).
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5 Phase semantics
Phase semantics is a semantics of provability. Like in Kripke models for modal logics or intuitionisitic
logic, a formula is not true or false, we rather have ways to express the extent to which it is true. In
Kripke semantics, the meaning of a formula is the set of so-called worlds at which it holds. In phase
semantics, a similar, but more structured, notion of phases is used. Formulas are interpreted by facts,
which are well-behaved sets of phases.
When setting up a notion of model, one has in mind both soundness and completeness of the
class of models to be defined. This class must be large enough to include most natural examples of
candidate models, and in particular it must contain the candidate syntactic model which will serve
to prove completeness. As a guide to the understanding of the notion of phase space, we expose first
what this syntactic model looks like. Its phases are just sequences of formulas. The intention is that
the interpretation of a formula A in this model is the set of all Γ’s such that ⊢ Γ, A. The soundness
theorem will have the following form: if ⊢ A, then A is valid, in the following sense: the special phase
1 (think of it as expressing the certitude that A holds) belongs to the interpretation of A. In the
syntactic model, 1 will be the empty sequence of formulas. Thus, in this model, the validity of A
is exactly the provability of ⊢ ∅, A, i.e., of ⊢ A. With these preparations, we can now define phase
spaces. We deal with MALL first.
Definition 5.1 A phase space is a pair (P,⊥) where P is a commutative monoid (in multiplicative
notation: pq, 1) and ⊥ ⊆ M is a distinguished subset of antiphases. One defines the following
operation on subsets of P : X⊥ = {q | ∀ p ∈ X pq ∈ ⊥}.
It may be useful to think of the q’s as observers of the elements of X and of pq ∈ ⊥ as a form of
agreement between the observer q and the observed p (somehow, a degenerated form of the kind of
dialogue described in section 2). We may say that “p passes the test q” when pq ∈ ⊥. A fact is a
subset F ⊆ P such that F⊥⊥ = F .
The following properties are easy to check, and the reader must have seen them somewhere already
(linear algebra!):
X ⊆ Y ⇒ Y ⊥ ⊆ X⊥
X ⊆ X⊥⊥
X⊥ = X⊥⊥⊥
F is a fact if and only if F = X⊥ for some X
(X ∪ Y )⊥ = X⊥ ∩ Y ⊥
Thus a fact is a set of elements that pass the same tests, an idea which will be re-used in the richer
setting of ludics. Notice also that facts obey F⊥⊥ = F , so that ⊥ is suitable for interpreting the linear
negation, provided all formulas are interpreted by facts. Notice also that ⊥ = {1}⊥, hence ⊥ is a fact,
which we use to interpret the constant ⊥. Also, P = ∅⊥ is a fact.
We now define the various connectives as operations on facts. We write XY = {pq | p ∈ X, q ∈ Y }.
F ⊗G = (FG)⊥⊥ ⊤ = ∅⊥ F&G = F ∩G .
The rest can be deduced by duality:
FOG = (F⊥G⊥)⊥ F ⊕G = (F ∪G)⊥⊥ 0 = P⊥ 1 = ⊥⊥
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(recall that ⊥ is interpreted by ⊥). This determines the interpretation of formulas, provided we have
assigned facts to atomic formulas. We freely say that A is interpreted by A, and if Γ = A1, . . . , An,
we also write freely Γ for (the interpretation of) A1O . . .OAn. The soundness theorem is stated as
follows:
Proposition 5.2 For any interpretation in a phase space, if ⊢ A1, . . . , An, then 1 ∈ A1O . . .OAn (we
say that A1, . . . , An is valid).
Proof. We just check the case of ⊥. Suppose 1 ∈ Γ. We have to show that 1 ∈ (Γ⊥⊥⊥)⊥, i.e., that
Γ⊥⊥⊥ ⊆ ⊥. Let p ∈ Γ⊥ and q ∈ ⊥⊥. Since 1 ∈ Γ, we have p ∈ ⊥, and since q ∈ ⊥⊥, we have pq ∈ ⊥.

The following is a less symmetric, but more intuitive characterization of the notion of validity.
Lemma 5.3 For any Γ = A1, . . . , An, and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Γ is valid if and only if (the interpretation
of) A⊥i is included in (the interpretation of) A1O . . .OAi−1OAi+1O . . .OAn.
Proof. For simplicity, we take n = 2, and we set A⊥1 = A and A2 = B. We have:
1 ∈ (A⊥⊥B⊥)⊥ ⇔ A⊥⊥B⊥ ⊆ ⊥ ⇔ A⊥⊥ ⊆ B⊥⊥ ⇔ A ⊆ B .

Hence, if A ≈ B, i.e., if A ⊢ B and B ⊢ A, then A and B are interpreted by the same fact.
In particular, we have that FO(G&H) = (FOG)&(FOH), for arbitrary facts F,G,H . (take the
formulas PO(Q&R) and (POQ)&(POR), with P,Q,R atomic and interpreted by F,G,H , respec-
tively). As an exercise, we provide below an ad hoc proof of this equality, which makes use of the
following property.
Lemma 5.4 Let X,Y ⊆ P . The following inclusion holds: X⊥⊥Y ⊥⊥ ⊆ (XY )⊥⊥.
Proof. We have to show that pqr ∈ ⊥ for any p ∈ X⊥⊥, q ∈ Y ⊥⊥ and r ∈ (XY )⊥. Taking some
f ∈ X , we get that rf ∈ Y ⊥, hence q(rf) = (rq)f ∈ ⊥. Since this was for arbitrary f ∈ X , we get
rq ∈ X⊥, and p(rq) = pqr ∈ ⊥. 
We have to prove L = (F⊥(G∩H)⊥)⊥ = (F⊥G⊥)⊥∩(F⊥H⊥)⊥. The right hand side can be rewritten
as follows:
(F⊥G⊥)⊥ ∩ (F⊥H⊥)⊥ = (F⊥G⊥ ∪ F⊥H⊥)⊥ = (F⊥(G⊥ ∪H⊥))⊥ = R .
Then we observe that G∩H ⊆ G entails (G∩H)⊥ ⊇ G⊥. We have (G∩H)⊥ ⊇ H⊥, similarly. Hence
F⊥(G ∩H)⊥ ⊇ F⊥(G⊥ ∪H⊥), from which L ⊆ R follows. For the converse direction, we exploit the
information that F,G,H are facts, i.e., that F = X⊥, G = Y ⊥, and H = Z⊥ for some subsets X,Y, Z
of P . We have then, using lemma 5.4:
L = (X⊥⊥(Y ⊥ ∩ Z⊥)⊥)⊥ = (X⊥⊥((Y ∪ Z)⊥⊥)⊥
⊇ (X(Y ∪ Z))⊥⊥⊥
= (X(Y ∪ Z))⊥
⊇ (X⊥⊥(Y ⊥⊥ ∪ Z⊥⊥))⊥ = R .
We now define the syntactic model. As announced, P is the set of the Γ = A1 . . . An’s (up to
the order of the formulas), written by juxtaposition (the monoid is given by concatenation), and
⊥ = {Γ | ⊢ Γ}.
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Proposition 5.5 Phase spaces form a complete class of models, i.e., if a MALL formula A is valid
in all phase spaces, then ⊢ A.
Proof. One shows by induction that the interpretation of A in the syntactic model is {Γ | ⊢ Γ, A},
and we conclude then as indicated at the beginning of the section. Let us call Pr(A) the latter set.
For atomic formulas, we just fix the intepretation of A to be Pr (A), but to this aim we must first
verify that Pr (A) is a fact, which we prove for an arbitrary formula A. We have to show that if
∆ ∈ Pr(A)⊥⊥, then ⊢ ∆, A. It follows easily from the fact that A ∈ Pr (A)⊥. We check only that
Pr(A ⊗B) ⊆ (Pr (A)Pr (B))⊥⊥. Let X = Pr(A)Pr (B) = {Γ1Γ2 | ⊢ A,Γ1 and ⊢ B,Γ2}. We have to
prove that if ∆ ∈ X⊥, then, for all Γ, ⊢ A ⊗ B,Γ entails ⊢ Γ,∆. We notice that A⊥B⊥ ∈ X since
⊢ A⊥, A and ⊢ B⊥, B. Hence ⊢ A⊥, B⊥,∆, and:
⊢ A⊗B,Γ
⊢ A⊥, B⊥,∆
⊢ A⊥OB⊥,∆
⊢ Γ,∆

We next give the phase semantics of exponentials. Like for intuitionistic logic, topological ideas
are useful. In the case of intuitionistic logic, in order to avoid the tautology (A or ¬A), one interprets,
say, ¬A by the interior of the complement of A in some topology. In the case of linear logic, we still
have to choose the right infinite conjunction and the finite disjunction used to define the “closed” sets.
Definition 5.6 A topolinear space is a structure (P,⊥,F), where (P,⊥) is a phase space, and where
F is a set of facts that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) F is closed by arbitrary intersections,
(2) F is closed by (finite) O, and (in particular) ⊥ ∈ F,
(3) ⊥ is the smallest fact of F,
(4) FOF ∈ F, for all F ∈ F.
The facts of F are called the closed facts. Given a fact F , we define ?F as the smallest closed fact
containing F .
Notice that, defining the open facts as the orthogonals of closed facts, we get a definition of !F as the
largest open fact contained in F .
The soundness theorem extends to full LL. For weakening, we proceed exactly as for the ⊥ rule,
using ⊥ ⊆?A. The validity of contraction is an obvious consequence of axiom (4). Using lemma 5.3,
the validity of dereliction and of promotion are immediate consequences of the axioms (3) and (2),
respectively.
We extend the definition of the syntactic model as follows. We take as closed facts arbitrary
intersections of sets of the form Pr(?A). Let us verify that this collection is closed under finite O’s.
We have proved FO(G&H) = (FOG)&(FOH) above. The infinitary version of this equality is proved
in the same way, so that we get
(
⋂
i∈I Pr(?Ai))O(
⋂
j∈J Pr(?Bj)) =
⋂
i∈I,j∈J (Pr(?Ai)OPr(?Bj))
=
⋂
i∈I,j∈J Pr(?AiO?Bj)
=
⋂
i∈I,j∈J Pr(?(Ai ⊕Bj))
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where the last equality follows from ?(Ai)O?(Bj) ≈?(Ai ⊕Bj). Also, ⊥ is a closed fact since ⊥ ≈ ?0,
and it is the smallest one, by the weakening rule. Axiom (4) is the consequence of two observations:
(†) ?A ≈?AO?A (‡) ?Ai ⊢?Ai, ?Aj .
(†) follows from A ⊢ A ⊕ A (by either of the ⊕ rules) and from ⊢ A⊥&A⊥, A), and (‡) is immediate
by weakening. Then we have:
(
⋂
i∈I Pr(?Ai))O(
⋂
j∈J Pr(?Aj)) =
⋂
i∈I,j∈J (Pr (?Ai)OPr(?Aj))
=
⋂
i∈I(Pr(?Ai)OPr(?Ai)) by (‡)
=
⋂
i∈I Pr(?Ai) by (†)
Thus the syntactic structure is a topolinear space.
We have to prove that Pr(?A) =
⋂
{Pr(?B) | Pr (A) ⊆ Pr(?B)}. Since Pr (A) ⊆ Pr(?A) by
dereliction, we have one inclusion. For the other, we have to show that if Pr (A) ⊆ Pr(?B) then
Pr(?A) ⊆ Pr(?B). So let ⊢ Γ, ?A. Since Pr(A) ⊆ Pr(?B), then in particular ⊢ A⊥, ?B, hence
⊢!A⊥, ?B by promotion. We conclude that Γ ∈ Pr(?B) by using the cut rule. This completes the
proof of completeness.
6 Coherence spaces
With coherence spaces, we give a semantics of proofs. Coherence spaces may be understood as
concrete descriptions of certain sets or domains, in the terminology of denotational semantics. They
are a simplified version of event structures [28].
Definition 6.1 A coherence space (E,⌢⌣) (E for short) is given by a set E of events, or tokens, and
by a binary reflexive and symmetric relation ⌢⌣ over E. E is called the web of (E,
⌢
⌣). A state, or
clique, of E is a set x of tokens satisfying the following consistency condition:
∀ e1, e2 ∈ x e1 ⌢⌣ e2.
We denote with D(E) the set of states of E, ordered by inclusion. If (E,⌢⌣) is a coherence space, its
incoherence is the relation defined by:
e1
⌣
⌢ e2 ⇔ ¬(e1
⌢
⌣ e2) or e1 = e2.
Notice that the incoherence is not the complement of the coherence, since the coherence and the
incoherence are both reflexive. We also define strict incoherence and strict coherence as follows,
respectively:
e1 ⌣ e2 ⇔ ¬(e1 ⌢⌣ e2) e1 ⌢ e2 ⇔ ¬(e1
⌣
⌢ e2)
Clearly, coherence can be recovered from incoherence:
e1
⌢
⌣ e2 ⇔ ¬(e1
⌣
⌢ e2) or e1 = e2.
In fact, it is easy to check that all the relations ⌢⌣,
⌣
⌢, ⌢ and ⌣ are interdefinable, that is, if one of
them is given, then the other three can be defined from it.
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We illustrate coherence spaces with a few ewamples. The coherence space Nat=(ω,⌢⌣), where
m⌢⌣ n if and only if m = n is such that D(Nat) = {∅}∪{{n} | n ∈ ω}, that is, D(Nat) is isomorphic
to the partial order {⊥} ∪ ω, ordered by the flat ordering x ≤ y if and only if x = ⊥ or x = y. This
partial order is used in denotational semantics to interpret the type of natural numbers.
We next show how to interpret the connectives of linear logic as constructions of coherence spaces.
Definition 6.2 The product, or “with”, E&E′ of two coherence spaces E and E′ is the coherence
space whose tokens are either e.1, with e ∈ E, or e′.2, with e′ ∈ E′ (using an explicit notation for
disjoint unions), and the coherence is given by:
(e1.i)⌢⌣ (e2.j)⇔ i 6= j or (i = j and e1
⌢
⌣ e2).
This definition is such that D(E&E′) is isomorphic to D(E) × D(E′), where × is the good old
set-theoretical cartesian product. For example, taking E = E′ = Nat, we have that (⊥,⊥), (m,⊥),
(⊥, n), and (m,n) are represented as ∅, {m.1}, {n.2}, and {m.1, n.2}, respectively.
Definition 6.3 The tensor product E ⊗ E′ of two coherence spaces E and E′ is the coherence space
whose tokens are pairs (e, e′) where e ∈ E and e′ ∈ E′, and whose coherence is given by:
(e1, e
′
1)
⌢
⌣ (e2, e
′
2)⇔ (e1
⌢
⌣ e2 and e
′
1
⌢
⌣ e
′
2).
We next introduce the duality, or linear negation.
Definition 6.4 The linear negation E⊥ of a coherence space (E,⌢⌣) is defined as E
⊥ = (E,⌣⌢).
The definition of the interpretation of O and⊸ (and also of ⊕ – left to the reader) is then obtained
by De Morgan duality.
Definition 6.5 Let E, E′ be coherence spaces. Their “par” EOE′ is the coherence space whose tokens
are pairs (e, e′) where e ∈ E and e′ ∈ E′, and whose incoherence is given by:
(e1, e
′
1)
⌣
⌢ (e2, e
′
2)⇔ (e1
⌣
⌢ e2 and e
′
1
⌣
⌢ e
′
2).
Definition 6.6 Let E, E′ be coherence spaces. Their linear implication E ⊸ E′ is the coherence
space whose tokens are pairs (e, e′) where e ∈ E and e′ ∈ E′, and whose incoherence is given by:
(e1, e
′
1)
⌣
⌢ (e2, e
′
2)⇔ (e1
⌢
⌣ e2 and e
′
1
⌣
⌢ e
′
2).
Exercise 6.7 Show that the following are other equivalent definitions of the coherence of the linear
function space:
(1) (e1, e
′
1)
⌢
⌣ (e2, e
′
2)⇔ (e1
⌢
⌣ e2 ⇒ (e
′
1
⌢
⌣ e
′
2 and (e1 6= e2 ⇒ e
′
1 6= e
′
2)))
(2) (e1, e
′
1)
⌢
⌣ (e2, e
′
2)⇔ (e1
⌢
⌣ e2 ⇒ e
′
1
⌢
⌣ e
′
2) and (e
′
1
⌣
⌢ e
′
2 ⇒ e1
⌣
⌢ e2) .
Definition 6.8 Let (E,⌢⌣) be a coherence space. The exponential !E is the coherence space whose
tokens are the finite cliques of E, and whose coherence is given by (x1 ⌢⌣ x2 ⇔ x1 ↑ x2), where x1 ↑ x2
means that there exists a clique x of E such that x1 ⊆ x and x2 ⊆ x.
Now we explain briefly the interpretation of LL in coherence spaces.
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1. A formula A is interpreted by a coherence space (it does not harm to use the same name, as we
did already for phase semantics).
2. A proof π of a sequent ⊢ A1, . . . , An is interpreted as a clique [[π]] of A1O . . .OAn.
3. If π rewrites through cut-elimination to π′, then [[π]] = [[π′]].
As an example, we show (2) for the cut rule. We first remark that a token of A1O . . .OAn is a vector
~e = (e1, . . . , en), and that (cf. the definition of O) we have
(†) ~e ⌢ ~f if and only if ei ⌢ fi for some i .
Let π1 be a proof of ⊢ Γ, A and π2 be a proof of ⊢ Γ′, A⊥. and let π be the proof of ⊢ Γ,Γ′ resulting
from applying the cut rule. We define the interpretation of π as follows (relation composition!):
[[π]] = {(~e, ~e′) | ∃ a (~e, a) ∈ [[π1]] and (~e′, a) ∈ [[π2]]} .
We have to show that [[π]] is a clique. Let (~e, ~e′), (~f, ~f ′) ∈ [[π]]. Then there exist a and b such that
(~e, a) ∈ [[π1]], (~e′, a) ∈ [[π2]], (~f, b) ∈ [[π1]], and (~f ′, b) ∈ [[π2]]. So, because we know by induction that
[[π1]] and [[π2]] are cliques, we have (~e, a)
⌢
⌣ (
~f, b) and (~e′, a) ⌢⌣ (
~f ′, b). If both (~e, a) = (~f, b) and
(~e′, a) = (~f ′, b), then we have also (~e, ~e′) = (~f, ~f ′) and a fortiori (~e, ~e′) ⌢⌣ (
~f, ~f ′), so we are done. Let
us suppose thus that, say, (~e, a)⌢ (~f, b). By property (†), there are two cases: either we have ei ⌢ fi
for some i, or a ⌢A b (the subscript A means that ⌢ is relative to A). In the first case, we have
directly that (~e, ~e′) ⌢ (~f, ~f ′), using (†). In the second case, we know that a 6= b (by the definition of
⌢), so a fortiori we have (~e′, a)⌢ (~f ′, b). Hence, by (†), either there exists i′ such that e′i′ ⌢ f
′
i′ , and
then we conclude as above, or a ⌢A⊥ b. But this cannot happen, because we have a ⌢A b, hence a
fortiori a ⌢⌣A b, which can be rephrased as a
⌣
⌢A⊥ b and in turn can be rephrased as ¬(a ⌢A⊥ b).
This ends the proof.
But there is more to this semantics. Coherence spaces can be organized in a category, actually
two categories: the category of stable functions (this is where it all started), and the category of
linear functions. The domains D(E) are closed under union of increasing sequences, that is, they are
complete partial orders. It remains to find appropriate morphisms between coherence spaces, defined
as appropriate functions from cliques to cliques.
Definition 6.9 Let (E,⌢⌣) and (E
′,⌢⌣) be two coherence spaces. A monotonous function f : D(E)→
D(E′) is called stable if it is continuous, i.e., f(
⋃
n∈ω xn) =
⋃
n∈ω f(xn) for every increasing sequence
xn, and if it preserves compatible intersections, i.e.:
∀x, y x ↑ y ⇒ f(x ∩ y) = f(x) ∩ f(y)
(notice that if x ↑ y, then x ∩ y is a clique). If moreover f preserves compatible unions, i.e.:
∀x, y x ↑ y ⇒ f(x ∪ y) = f(x) ∪ f(y)
then f is called linear. Stable functions are ordered by the stable ordering ≤s, defined as follows:
f ≤s g if and only if (∀x ∈ D(E) f(x) ≤ g(x)) (pointwise ordering) and
∀x ≤ y f(x) = g(x) ∩ f(y) .
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Proposition 6.10 For all (E,⌢⌣), (E
′,⌢⌣), (Coh[E,E
′],≤s) (the partial order of stable functions)
is order-isomorphic to (D(!E ⊸ E′),⊆).
Proof (indication). The inverse bijections are defined as follows. Given a stable function f we
define its trace, and given a clique φ of !E ⊸ E′ we define the inverse transformation as follows,
respectively:
trace(f) = {(x, e′) | e′ ∈ f(x) and (∀ y < x e′ 6∈ f(y))}
fun(φ)(z) = {e′ | ∃x x ≤ z and (x, e′) ∈ φ} .
The most interesting part of the proof consists in verifying that trace(f) is a clique, and that the
stable ordering is just the inclusion of traces. One uses the following characterization of the coherence
relation of !E ⊸ E′ (cf. exercise 6.7):
(x1, e
′
1)
⌢
⌣ (x2, e
′
2)⇔ (x1
⌢
⌣ x2 ⇒ (e
′
1
⌢
⌣ e
′
2 and (e
′
1 = e
′
2 ⇒ x1 = x2))) .
The trace has an operational flavour: one can read (x, e′) ∈ trace(f) and x ≤ z as: “x is the (finite)
part of z which is used to compute the output event e′ ∈ f(z)”. Indeed, x is unique with that
property, by the above characterization of the coherence, and is called the minimum point for y and
e′ The stable ordering now also has an operational flavour: if f ≤s g, then “f and g are computed
in the same way” in the sense that g has to respect the minimum points of f . We show that f ≤s g
implies trace(f) ⊆ trace(g). Let (x, e′) ∈ trace(f). Then e′ ∈ f(x) ⊆ g(x), and hence there exists
(y, e′) ∈ trace(g) such that y ≤ x. We show that y = x, which will establish the inclusion. Suppose
z < x. Then we would have e′ ∈ f(y) = f(x) ∩ g(y), which contradicts the minimality of x. The
converse implication is proved similarly. 
This proposition has a capital historical importance: it is the observation of the quasi-symmetry
of input and output in the traces of stable functions which lead Girard to force a complete symmetry
by deciding that finite cliques can be considered as atoms, or events of a new coherence space, and
hence by decomposing E → E′ as !E ⊸ E′.
Exercise 6.11 Show that for all (E,⌢⌣), (E
′,⌢⌣), (Cohl[E,E
′],≤s) (the partial order of linear func-
tions) is order-isomorphic to (D(E ⊸ E′),⊆).
7 Categorical models
In this section, we describe a general categorical semantics for linear logic, and we introduce the
appropriate categorical apparatus. We assume that the reader knows about categories, functors,
natural transformations, and adjunctions. We briefly reintroduce other rather standard notions such
as monoidal categories and comonads, as well as more ad hoc notions and axioms that are needed to
complete the picture.
Definition 7.1 A monoidal category is a category C equipped with a functor ⊗ : C×C→ C, called
the tensor product, a distinguished object 1, called the tensor unit, and natural isomorphisms, also
called the canonical isomorphisms:
α : A⊗ (B ⊗ C)→ (A⊗B)⊗ C ιl : 1⊗A→ A ιr : A⊗ 1→ A ,
satisfying the following two so-called coherence equations:
(α − α) α ◦ α = (α⊗ id) ◦ α ◦ (id ⊗ α) (α − ι) (ιr ⊗ id) ◦ α = id ⊗ ιl .
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Where do the two coherence equations come from? As observed by Huet (unpublished), a good
answer comes from rewriting theory (a subject that did not exist as such when monoidal categories
were defined by Mac Lane in the early sixties). Consider the domains and codomains of the canonical
isomorphisms as the left and right hand sides of rewriting rules and rewriting sequences, respectively:
(α) A⊗ (B ⊗ C)→ (A⊗B)⊗ C (ιl) 1⊗A→ A (ιr) A⊗ 1→ A
The two coherence equations correspond to equating different reduction sequences: α ◦ α encodes
A⊗ (B ⊗ (C ⊗D))→ (A⊗B)⊗ (C ⊗D)→ ((A⊗B)⊗ C)⊗D ,
while (α⊗ id) ◦ α ◦ (id ⊗ α) encodes
A⊗ (B ⊗ (C ⊗D))→ A⊗ ((B ⊗ C)⊗D)→∗ ((A ⊗B)⊗ C)⊗D .
Similarly, the two sides of the second equation encode
A⊗ (1⊗B)→ (A⊗ 1)⊗B → A⊗B
A⊗ (1⊗B)→ A⊗B .
These pairs of derivations form local confluence diagrams for the rewriting system on objects induced
by (α), (ιl), and (ιr). We pursue this interpretation in exercise 7.2, which assumes basic familiarity
with rewriting theory.
Exercise 7.2 (1) Find all the critical pairs of the rewriting system on objects underlying α, ιl, and ιr,
and show that the corresponding equations between canonical isomorphisms are derivable from the two
equations given in definition 7.1. Hint: There are three other critical pairs; exploit the fact that
α, ιl, and ιr are isos. (2) Prove the so-called coherence theorem for monoidal categories: every two
canonical morphisms (that is, terms over the signature {◦, id, ⊗, α, α−1, ιl, ι
−1
l , ιr, ι
−1
r }) with the
same domain and codomain are equal. Hint: Remove first α−1, ι−1l , and ι
−1
r , and proceed as in the
proof of Knuth-Bendix theorem (confluence of critical pairs implies local confluence) [21].
Definition 7.3 A symmetric monoidal category is a monoidal category together with an additional
canonical isomorphism γ : A⊗B → B ⊗A satisfying:
(γ − γ) γ ◦ γ = id
(α− γ) α ◦ γ ◦ α = (γ ⊗ id) ◦ α ◦ (id ⊗ γ) .
The coherence theorem still holds in the symmetric monoidal case, but needs more care: clearly we
do not want to identify γ : A ⊗ A → A ⊗ A and id : A ⊗ A → A ⊗ A. Category theorists exclude
this by speaking, not of terms, but of natural transformations: in the present case, we see that
γ : (λ(A,B).A⊗B)→ (λ(A,B).B ⊗A) and id : (λ(A,B).A⊗B)→ (λ(A,B).A⊗B) do not have the
same codomain. A more elementary point of view is to restrict attention to linear terms for objects.
Exercise 7.4 Show that, in a symmetric monoidal category, any two canonical natural transforma-
tions between the same functors are equal. Hints: Use monoidal coherence, and the following presen-
tation of the symmetric group by means of the transpositions σi which permute two successive elements
i and i+ 1:
σi ◦ σi = id σi ◦ σj = σj ◦ σi (j − i > 1) σi ◦ σi+1 ◦ σi = σi+1 ◦ σi ◦ σi+1.
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Definition 7.5 A monoidal closed category is a monoidal category C such that for all A the functor
λC.(C ⊗ A) has a right adjoint, written λB.(A ⊸ B). In other words, for every objects A,B, there
exists an object A⊸ B, called the linear exponent, and natural bijections (for all C):
Λl : C[C ⊗A,B]→ C[C,A⊸ B].
Notice that there are no accompanying additional coherence equations for monoidal closed cat-
egories. This comes from the difference in nature between the constructions ⊗ and ⊸: the latter
is given together with a universal construction (an adjunction), while the first is just a functor with
some associated isomorphisms. This difference is often referred to as the difference between “additional
structure” (⊗) and “property” (⊸). The notion of dualizing object, due to Barr [6] and introduced
next, is additional structure.
Definition 7.6 A symmetric monoidal closed category C is called ∗-autonomous if it has a distin-
guished object ⊥, called a dualizing object, such that for any A the morphisms
Λl(Λ
−1
l (id) ◦ γ) : C[A, (A⊸ ⊥)⊸ ⊥],
called canonical, have an inverse. We write A⊥ for A⊸ ⊥, and A⊥⊥ for (A⊥)⊥.
Exercise 7.7 Let C be a ∗-autonomous category. Show that: (1) there exists a natural bijection
between C[A,B] and C[B⊥, A⊥]; (2) there exists a natural isomorphism (A ⊸ B)⊥ ∼= A ⊗ B⊥; (3)
there exists a natural isomorphism 1 ∼= ⊥⊥.
Part (3) of exercise 7.7 shows in retrospective that the name ⊥ for the dualizing object is deserved:
we can indeed understand it as the multiplicative false.
Exercise 7.8 Suppose that C is a symmetric monoidal category, and that ( )⊥ : Cop → C is a functor
given together with: (1) a natural isomorphism A ∼= A⊥⊥; (2) a natural bijection C[I, (A ⊗B⊥)⊥] ∼=
C[A,B]. Show that C is monoidal closed, with ⊸ defined by A⊸ B = (A⊗B⊥)⊥.
The last ingredient we need is the notion of comonad.
Definition 7.9 A comonad over a category C is a triple (T, ǫ, δ) where T : C → C is a functor,
ǫ : T → idC, δ : T → T ◦ T are natural transformations, and the following equations hold:
ǫTA ◦ δA = idTA T ǫA ◦ δA = idTA δTA ◦ δA = TδA ◦ δA ,
where e.g. δA : TA→ T (TA) stands for the component of δ at A. The following derived operation is
useful. For all f : TA→ B, one constructs κ(f) : TA→ TB as follows:
κ(f) = Tf ◦ δ.
We define the co-Kleisli category CT as follows. The objects of CT are the objects of C, and for any
A,B:
CT [A,B] = C[TA,B].
The identity morphisms are given by ǫ, and composition ◦T is defined by:
g ◦T f = g ◦ κ(f).
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Comonads are tightly linked with adjunctions, as the following exercises evidentiate.
Exercise 7.10 Show that every adjunction (F,G, η, ǫ), where F : C → C′ and G : C′ → C, induces
a comonad (F ◦ G, ǫ, δ) on C′, where ǫ is the counit of the adjunction, and where δ = FηG, i.e.,
δB = F (ηGB) (for all B). Show that the co-Kleisli category associated with the comonad is equivalent
to the full subcategory of C whose objects are in the image of G.
Exercise 7.11 Let (T, ǫ, δ) be a comonad over a category C. Show that the following data define
adjoint functors F and U between C and CT in such a way that T = FU :
FA = !A Ff = κ(f) UA = A Ug = g ◦ ǫ
with id as unit and ǫ as counit of the adjunction.
We next follow [27] for a first attempt of interpretation of LL. We recall that a category C is
cartesian if it has a terminal object ⊤ (i.e., such that for any A the homset C[A,⊤] has exactly
one arrow ⊤A) and binary products (i.e., for every objects A,B there exists (A&B, π : A&B →
A, π′ : A&B → B) such that for all C, f : C → A, and g : C → B there exists a unique arrow
〈f, g〉 : C → A&B such that π ◦ 〈f, g〉 = f and π′ ◦ 〈f, g〉 = g; the product is then a functor, with
f&g = 〈f ◦ π, f ◦ π′〉).
Definition 7.12 A Seely category is a structure consisting of the following data: (1) a ∗-autonomous
category C which is at the same time cartesian; (2) a comonad (!, ǫ, δ) over C, called the exponential,
together with two natural isomorphisms:
nA,B : (!A)⊗ (!B) ∼=!(A&B) p : 1 ∼=!⊤ .
Proposition 7.13 If C is a Seely category, then the associated co-Kleisli category C! is cartesian.
Proof. We take the product on objects and the pairing of arrows of C. As projections we take π1 ◦ ǫ
and π2 ◦ ǫ. We check one commutation diagram:
(π1 ◦ ǫ) ◦! 〈f, f ′〉 = π1 ◦ (ǫ ◦ κ(〈f, f ′〉))
= π1 ◦ 〈f, f ′〉 = f . 
Exercise 7.14 Show that if C is a Seely category, then the associated co-Kleisli category C! is carte-
sian closed (i.e., for any object A the functor λC.(C&A) has a right adjoint).
Exercise 7.15 Let C be a ∗-autonomous category which is at the same time cartesian, and which is
equipped with a comonad (!, ǫ, δ) such that the associated Kleisli category C! is cartesian closed. Show
that there exists a natural isomorphism from (!A) ⊗ (!B) to !(A&B).
Another implied structure is that each object of the form !A is endowed with the structure of a
commutative comonoid: there are two arrows
e : !A→ 1 d : !A→ (!A)⊗ (!A)
satisfying the three (categorical versions of the) comonoid laws (see exercise 7.17). These arrows are
constructed as follows:
e = p−1◦!(⊤) ◦ δ d = n−1◦ !(〈ǫ, ǫ〉) ◦ δ .
This definition may seem ad hoc, but it is actually derived from the underlying co-Kleisli adjunction
(exercise 7.11) and from the comonoid structure induced by the cartesian products of C! (proposition
7.13 and exercise 7.16): e = p−1 ◦ F⊤ and d = n−1 ◦ F∆.
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Exercise 7.16 Let C be a cartesian category. Let ∆ = 〈id , id〉 : A → A&A. Show that ∆ and ⊤A
define a commutative comonoid structure, i.e., verify the equations of exercise 7.17.
Exercise 7.17 Let d and e be as just defined. Show that the following equations are satisfied:
ιl ◦ (e⊗ id) ◦ d = id ιr ◦ (id ⊗ e) ◦ d = id
α ◦ (id ⊗ d) ◦ d = (d⊗ id) ◦ d γ ◦ d = d .
We are now in a position to sketch the interpretation of the sequents of linear logic in a Seely
category C. A proof of a sequent ⊢ A1, . . . , An is interpreted by a morphism f : 1 → (A1O . . .OAn)
(confusing the formulas with their interpretations as objects of Cl), or (cf. exercise 7.7) as a morphism
from Γ⊥ to ∆, for any splitting A1, . . . , An = Γ∪∆. We shall freely go from one of these representations
to another. The rules are interpreted as follows:
(1) ⊢ 1 is interpreted by id : 1→ 1.
(⊥) Obvious, since ⊥ is the dual of 1 (cf. exercise 7.7) and since 1⊗ 1 ∼= 1.
(⊗) From f : Γ⊥ → A and g : ∆⊥ → B, we form f ⊗ g : Γ⊥ ⊗∆⊥ → A⊗B.
(O) Obvious by associativity of O.
(Axiom) We simply take id : A→ A.
(Cut) Compose f : Γ⊥ → A and g : A→ ∆.
(⊤) Interpreting ⊢ ⊤,Γ amounts to giving an arrow from Γ⊥ to ⊤. Since ⊤ is terminal, we take the
unique such arrow.
(&) The pairing of f : Γ⊥ → A and g : Γ⊥ → B yields 〈f, g〉 : Γ⊥ → (A&B).
(⊕) Given f : A⊥ → Γ, we build f ◦ π1 : A⊥&B⊥ → Γ, which we can consider as a morphism from 1
to (A⊕B)OΓ.
(Dereliction) Given f : A⊥ → Γ, we build f ◦ǫ : !(A⊥)→ Γ, where ǫ is the first natural transformation
of the comonad.
(Promotion) Let f : 1→ (AO?B1O . . .O?Bn), which we can consider as an arrow from !(B⊥1 & . . .&B
⊥
n )
to A. Here we have made an essential use of the natural isomorphisms required in the definition of a
Seely category. Then we can consider κ(f) : !(B⊥1 & . . .&B
⊥
n )→!A as a proof of ⊢!A, ?B1, . . . , ?Bn.
(Weakening) For this case and the following one, we use the comonoid structure induced on !A. Let
f : 1→ Γ. Then we can consider that f ◦ e = !(A⊥)→ Γ is a proof of ⊢?A,Γ.
(Contraction) This case is similar to the case (Weakening), replacing e by d.
(Exchange) By associativity and commutativity.
So far, so good. But is the interpretation invariant under cut-elimination, which is what we want
of a model? The answer is: almost. We shall treat the contraction reduction in detail. Referring to
section 3 for notation, the proof Π of ⊢ Γ1, ?B⊥, ?B⊥ is interpreted by, say, a morphism h :!B⊗!B → C,
where C interprets Γ1, and the proof Π
′ of ⊢?Γ2, B is interpreted by, say, a morphism g :!A → B,
where A interprets Γ⊥2 , assuming for the time being that Γ2 is just one formula. Then the validation
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of the contraction reduction amounts to the following commutativity equation: dB◦ !g ◦ δA = ((!g ◦
δA)⊗ (!g ◦ δA)) ◦ dA, which is a consequence of the following two commutativity equations:
d!A ◦ δA = (δA ⊗ δA) ◦ dA (!g⊗ !g) ◦ d!A = dB◦!g .
These two equations are instances of the following more general statement:
(P ) ∀ f :!A→!A′ (δA′ ◦ f = !f ◦ δA) (every free coalgebra morphism
⇒ (dA′ ◦ f = (f ⊗ f) ◦ dA) is also a comonoid morphism)
(A coalgebra over A is a morphism f : A→!A and the free coalgebras are the coalgebras δA over !A.)
Indeed, δ is a free coalgebra morphism, by the law δ!A ◦ δA = !δA ◦ δA, and, for any g : A→ A′, !g is
a free coalgebra morphism by naturality of δ.
Property (P ) cannot be derived from the sole axioms of Seely, as was noted by Benton, Bierman,
Hyland and de Paiva [7] (for a survey and more references, see [26]). Below, we show how to prove (P )
assuming only one new equation (S+) with respect to Seely’s axiomatization. The reasoning could be
carried out entirely in the category C, but it really arises via a tour into the co-Kleisli adjunction of
the comonad ! (cf. exercise 7.11), without which the equation (S+) would seem ad hoc.
The equation (S+) asserts the naturality of n, between the two functors F 1 ⊗ F 2 and F ( 1& 2)
from C!&C! to C, that is, for all f ∈ C![A,A′], g ∈ C![B,B′]:
(S+) F (f&g) ◦ nA,B = nA′,B′ ◦ (Ff ⊗ Fg)
or, in a form that only mentions C:
(S+) ! < f◦ !π, g◦ !π′ > ◦ δA&B ◦ nA,B = nA′,B′ ◦ ((!f ◦ δA)⊗ (!g ◦ δB)) .
Now we show that (P ) holds (we follow [26][section 3.5]). We first remark that d can be reformulated
as follows:
d = n−1UA,UA ◦ F∆UA
= (ǫFUA ⊗ ǫFUA) ◦ (FηUA ⊗ FηUA) ◦ n
−1
UA,UA ◦ F∆UA (adjunction law)
= (ǫFUA ⊗ ǫFUA) ◦ n
−1
UFUA,UFUA ◦ F (ηUA&ηUA) ◦ F∆UA (by (S
+))
= (ǫFUA ⊗ ǫFUA) ◦ n
−1
UFUA,UFUA ◦ F∆UFUA ◦ FηUA (∆ natural)
As FηUA = δA, this gives us a handle to use the assumption of (P ) in the proof of its conclusion:
dA′ ◦ f
= (ǫFUA′ ⊗ ǫFUA′) ◦ n
−1
UFUA′,UFUA′
◦ F∆UFUA′ ◦ δA′ ◦ f
= (ǫFUA′ ⊗ ǫFUA′) ◦ n
−1
UFUA′,UFUA′
◦ F∆UFUA′ ◦ FUf ◦ δA (assumption)
= (ǫFUA′ ⊗ ǫFUA′) ◦ n
−1
UFUA′,UFUA′
◦ F (Uf&Uf) ◦ F∆UFUA ◦ δA (∆ natural)
= (ǫFUA′ ⊗ ǫFUA′) ◦ (FUf ⊗ FUf) ◦ n
−1
UFUA,UFUA ◦ F∆UFUA ◦ δA (by (S
+))
= (f ⊗ f) ◦ (ǫFUA ⊗ ǫFUA) ◦ n
−1
UFUA,UFUA ◦ F∆UFUA ◦ δA (ǫ natural)
= (f ⊗ f) ◦ dA
Now, we have to lift the restriction on the context Γ2. What happens if Γ2 consists of two or more
formulas, say, Γ2 = A
⊥
1 , A
⊥
2 ? Well, not a big deal, since !A1⊗ !A2 is isomorphic to !(A1&A2), so we
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can proceed as we did. Yes, but there are two distinct contraction rules in
⊢ Γ1, ?A⊥1 , ?A
⊥
2 , ?A
⊥
1 , ?A
⊥
2
⊢ Γ1, ?A⊥1 , ?A
⊥
2
and hence the interpretation of the right hand side is, up to associativity and commutavity, ((!g ◦
δA) ⊗ (!g ◦ δA)) ◦ (dA1 ⊗ dA2) and not ((!g ◦ δA) ⊗ (!g ◦ δA)) ◦ dA1&A2 . We shall be done if we have
dA1 ⊗ dA2 = dA1&A2 up to associativity and commutativity.
It remains to consider the case where Γ2 is empty. Then one still proceeds as we did, setting
A = ⊤, but at the price of introducing a useless d :!⊤ → !⊤⊗ !⊤, which should be the identity up to
the two canonical isomorphisms ιl ◦ (p−1⊗ !⊤) and ιr ◦ (!⊤ ⊗ p−1).
Exercise 7.18 Formulate these equalities more precisely, and show that they are consequences of the
following equations (taken from [26][section 4])
(S+α ) nA&B,C ◦ (nA,B⊗ !C) ◦ α!A,!B,!C = !αA,B,C ◦ nA,B&C ◦ (!A⊗ nB,C)
(S+γ ) nB,A ◦ γ!A,!B = !γA,B ◦ nA,B
(S+ιl ) (ιl)!A = !(ιl)A ◦ n⊤,A ◦ (p⊗ !A)
(S+ιr) (ιr)!A = !(ιr)A ◦ nA,⊤ ◦ (!A⊗ p)
which use the fact that a cartesian category is a fortiori monoidal.
Exercise 7.19 With the help of the same equations, show that the weakening reduction and the “box-
box” reduction (I.e. a cut between two promotions ⊢?Γ1, ?B⊥, !C and ⊢?Γ2, !B) are valid. Hint: For
the latter, prove first that δ ◦ Ff = !Ff ◦ δ, for any f :!A→ B.
We have completed the definition of a categorical model of linear logic, which we wrap in the
following definition.
Definition 7.20 A Seely+ category is a Seely category which moreover satisifes S+, (S+α ), (S
+
ιl
),
(S+ιr), and (S
+
γ ).
In more synthetic terms, this definition says that the functor F : C! → C is (strong) monoidal.
We end the section by sketching the proof that the category Cohl of coherence spaces and linear
functions forms a Seely+ category.
Proposition 7.21 The inclusion functor from Cohl to the category Coh of coherence spaces and
stable functions has a left adjoint, and Cohl together with the comonad on Cohl induced by the
adjunction yields a Seely category whose co-Kleisli category is equivalent to Coh.
Proof. The adjunction is an immediate consequence of proposition 6.10 and exercise 6.11. For the
symmetric monoidal structure, we just notice that at the level of events the canonical isomorphisms
are given by:
((e, e′), e′′)↔ (e, (e′, e′′)) (e, ∗)↔ e (∗, e)↔ e (e, e′)↔ (e′, e) .
There is a natural bijection Cohl[1, E] ∼= D(E), since (∗, e1)⌢⌣ (∗, e2) boils down to e1
⌢
⌣ e2. Hence
we have:
Cohl[1, (E ⊗ E
′⊥)⊥] ∼= D(E ⊗ E′⊥)⊥)
= D(E ⊸ E′)
∼= Cohl[E,E′] (cf. exercise 6.11) .
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Then the closed structure follows from exercise 7.8.
To see that Cohl is ∗-autonomous, we set ⊥ = 1⊥ (= 1), and we observe the trace of Λl(Λ
−1
l (id) ◦
γ) : A→ (A⊸ ⊥)⊸ ⊥, which is {(e, ((e, ∗), ∗)) | e ∈ E}. It has as inverse the function whose trace
is {(((e, ∗), ∗), e) | e ∈ E}.
That Coh is equivalent to the co-Kleisli category follows from exercise 7.10. We are left to verify
the two natural isomorphisms. The first one holds by exercise 7.15. For the second one, notice that
D(1) is a singleton. 
Exercise 7.22 Show that the transformations ǫ and δ associated with the comonad !◦ ⊆ on Cohl are
the following functions:
ǫ(X) = {e | {e} ∈ X} δ(X) = {Y |
⋃
Y ∈ X} ,
and check that the coherent model satisfies the other axioms of Seely+ categories.
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